Imagine that an anti-religious post spreads online and sparks unrest
across the country. The government asks the platform to remove it, but the
platform refuses. With no other option, the authorities block the entire
service, cutting millions of lawful users off from content they are entitled to
access. The scenario is fictitious, but it captures the practical challenges
Bangladesh faces.
Technology has opened up remarkable opportunities for Bangladeshis, but
its widespread adoption has also created greater scope for misuse. The state
can punish offenders within its borders, but the platforms hosting harmful
content, and often the individuals posting it, operate beyond them.
The Cyber Security Act 2026 and the Bangladesh Telecommunications Act
2001, as amended in 2026, are the primary laws governing content safety and the
removal of unlawful content.
Section 8 of the Cyber Security Act 2026 sets out the procedures for
removing, transferring or blocking certain material. The Act criminalises
content that undermines the country’s integrity, security, defence or public
order; religious, communal or ethnic hate speech that incites violence; and
instructions intended to facilitate disorder or criminal activity. It also
criminalises sexual harassment, blackmail, revenge pornography and hate speech
that incites hostility.
Where a law enforcement agency has reason to believe that information
published through digital or electronic media falls within one of these
categories, it may act through the Director General of the Cyber Security
Agency or request the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC)
to take action. Upon receiving a request or a tribunal order, the BTRC or the
relevant agency within the ICT Division must ask the technology company to
remove the content or, where applicable, block access to it.
Neither the Agency nor the BTRC is empowered to remove content directly
from a platform; the law only allows these authorities to request its removal.
However, it does not adequately address the consequences of a company’s refusal
to comply with such a request or even a court order. As a result, the
effectiveness of enforcement depends largely on the technology company’s
willingness to comply, rather than on the authority’s ability to ensure
compliance.
The BTRC does, however, have other enforcement tools. The
Telecommunications Act 2001 grants it broad powers to block access at the
internet service provider (ISP) level, and these powers were expanded in 2026
to cover cross-border and online services. But ISP-level blocking closes the
road without fixing the problem. Shutting down an entire service because of a
single fraudulent account can deprive millions of lawful users of services they
rely on. It is also a measure particularly susceptible to misuse against
legitimate speech. Instead, technology companies and the relevant Bangladeshi
authorities should establish technical arrangements for removing specified
content, reducing the need for ISP-level blocking.
The law takes a positive step towards transparency on the state’s part by
requiring the authority to provide information when content is blocked. The
same principle of transparency should apply to decisions made by technology
companies.
Although these laws have extraterritorial effect, allowing action to be
taken in respect of certain offences committed outside Bangladesh, enforcement
remains challenging. Offshore service providers may have no physical presence
in Bangladesh. The cross-border digital trade framework governing them does not
require a local presence, and a business may be registered through a legally
appointed representative. However, the law does not clearly define the rights
and liabilities of such representatives. It is therefore uncertain whether a
representative can be held responsible when a company refuses to comply with a
request or an order. The draft Digital Trade Cross-Border Policy 2026, which
has yet to become law, is also unclear about whether offshore companies must
establish a physical presence in Bangladesh. In practice, where an entity has
no local presence or other effective means of enforcement, the authority’s
ability to compel compliance may be severely limited.
Bangladesh’s VAT framework addresses similar situations involving
services supplied by offshore entities. It requires a non-resident that does
not carry on economic activity from a fixed place in Bangladesh to appoint a
VAT agent and specifies the agent’s functions. The Finance Act 2021 went
further by addressing the allocation of liability between the agent and the
non-resident principal. Subsequent amendments have exempted the agent from
certain liabilities, as the tax authorities have other means of reaching the
non-resident principal, including through payment flows, registration and
assessment.
Following a similar approach, content-removal legislation should require
offshore technology companies to appoint a representative in Bangladesh,
whether a legal entity or a named officer. The representative should be
authorized to accept service of Section 8 requests and tribunal orders and to
facilitate compliance with them. Liability should arise from failure to comply
with a valid, tribunal-approved notice or order, rather than from the content
itself.
Brazil also offers a comparable approach: its Supreme Court has required
platforms to maintain a legal representative in the country who can respond to
authorities and comply with judicial and regulatory obligations.
A
recent development in India shows what happens when takedown procedures are
unclear. The government sends takedown notices to platforms through its
Sahyog portal, relying on Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act
and arguing that platforms that ignore them risk losing their safe-harbor
protection. X (previously known as Twitter) challenged this approach, arguing
that blocking must instead follow Section 69A, the Act’s formal blocking
mechanism. Bangladesh should act before facing similar disputes, by enacting
clear and certain laws that protect the interests of the government, users and
technology companies alike.
Bangladesh does not lack a law on harmful online content. It lacks a way
to make that law bind the companies it is meant to reach. What the country
needs is clear and certain law, together with an effective mechanism that lets
authorities secure the removal of specific content through valid orders or
notices, so that ISP-level blocking becomes a last resort rather than the
default.
Fateen Farhan is Barrister-at-Law and a technology law enthusiast.
